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22 December 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Central Intelligence

FROM: Acting Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

SUBJECT: Deputies' Committee Meeting on Bosnia
23 December, 1600-1630

1. The Principals at their December 12 meeting agreed-- apparently at Strobe Talbott's suggestion--to reengage the Deputies in the policy discussions on Bosnia. This will be the second meeting since then and will be principals only. It was called without any notice, and no papers were circulated for it.

2. The purpose of the meeting is to follow up on issues from previous meetings on Bosnia policy. You have not been tasked to lead on any topic, but may be asked to give an intelligence update, especially regarding the impact of the Carter mission, the status of current fighting, and the prospects for a cease-fire. You will be provided an intelligence update at the 1100 pre-brief.

Diplomatic Strategy in Wake of Carter Mission

3. State--most likely Ambassador Thomas if he is available--will have the lead. He will probably focus on the results of former President Carter's mission this week, the next steps for the cease-fire, and how to approach renewed negotiations. Apparently the Contact Group has agreed to let Akashi handle the details of arranging the cease-fire while it takes next week off. At the meeting, they will discuss the Contact Group next steps, such as the operational significance of the Bosnian Serbs' agreement to participate in negotiations "on the basis of the Contact Group plan." The book includes a tab with our assessment of the impact of the Carter mission. Now we believe that the odds favor a cease-fire in which the level of violence is reduced because both sides need time to regroup and the winter weather complicates fighting.

Strengthening UNPROFOR: Follow-Up to The Hague

4. JCS will report on the results of this week's Chief of Defense Staff (CHOD) meeting in The Hague. The US wanted the CHOD to approve various strategies for making UNPROFOR more effective. The Principals decided previously to seek a strengthened UNPROFOR to counter arguments by Dole and others that UNPROFOR should be withdrawn so we can lift the arms embargo.

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5. The enhancement options included authorizing UNPROFOR to force convoys through obstructions and forcibly open convoy routes, to redeploy UNPROFOR or give it more aggressive rules of engagement and more equipment. The CHOD failed to agree to the more active measures, mainly because of Russian and British opposition, and only approved the equipment option.

6. We have provided several items on UNPROFOR:

- A planning enhancements paper that reports on the CHOD;
- A paper requested by the J2 concerning the likely reactions of the warring parties to a more muscular UNPROFOR;
- An analysis that judges UNPROFOR is likely to remain at least through the spring;
- And some statistics and maps on UNPROFOR deployments.

Inter-Serbian Sanctions

7. The Deputies will discuss strategy as the 100-day period of partial sanctions suspension ends on 13 January. At the last PC, the Principals agreed to decide policy based solely on the facts. The DC will probably commission the Sanctions Working Group (SWG) to come up with a paper next week--with BTF assistance--that will analyze what has happened in inter-Serbian sanctions, whether Milosevic has lived up to his promise to close the Bosnian border, and what steps to take. Then the SWG will run its strategy past the Deputies and Principals during the first week in January.

8. If the US recommends extension of the suspension, the Administration will need to explain to the hawks in Congress why they are being easy on Serbia. If the US recommends otherwise, there could be significant political fallout within the Contact Group. We have included the key judgments of our net assessment on inter-Serbian sanctions and a Leon Fuerth paper on strategy which may not be discussed.

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Congressional and Public Affair Strategy

9. State will also lead on the Congressional/Public Strategy, which is mainly a strategy for dealing with probable Congressional pressure to impose unilateral lift. Also, there may be further discussion of the advisability of vetoing legislation including unilateral lift language. The group may also continue earlier discussions of whether to seek Congressional authorization for committing US ground troops to help evacuate UNPROFOR.


Ray Converse~~SECRET~~
